Add Trusted Path Execution #24
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This patch was modified from Grsecurity's Trusted Path Execution feature Implements the concept described here: http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
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Got the request for this feature here: |
thestinger
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May 12, 2017
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com> Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@nmatt0: Thanks for porting this functionality. Just out of curiosity, why a separate implementation from the tpe-lkm which seems to implement a number of other features from grsec? Are there security concerns around the ftrace imlementation, or just for readability and ease of adoption? Lastly, should be an OR, or actually an AND? |
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@sempervictus I had not seen tpe-lkm so I will have to look into that and see if I can expand on my current TPE. My initial opinion is that I regards to some of the logic in my TPE patch, I really need to revise some of that logic since I removed all of grsecurities ifdef's in exchange for using the variables I am closing this PR in order to improve it. Work will be taking place in my dev branch at: https://github.com/nmatt0/linux-hardened/tree/nmatt-dev |
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Food for thought - ftrace is used because of code injection by and out-of-tree module. Building something in-tree shouldn't need to use that. I noticed that LSM may have become somewhat stackable with recent kernels, that's probably the best first approach here. |
thestinger
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Jul 3, 2017
Preemption can occur during cancel preemption timer, and there will be
inconsistent status in lapic, vmx and vmcs field.
CPU0 CPU1
preemption timer vmexit
handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
vmx_cancel_hv_timer
vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1
vmcs_clear_bits
/* hv_timer_in_use still true */
sched_out
sched_in
kvm_arch_vcpu_load
vmx_set_hv_timer
write vmx->hv_deadline_tsc
vmcs_set_bits
/* back in kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer */
hv_timer_in_use = false
...
vmx_vcpu_run
vmx_arm_hv_run
write preemption timer deadline
spurious preemption timer vmexit
handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
WARN_ON(!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use);
This can be reproduced sporadically during boot of L2 on a
preemptible L1, causing a splat on L1.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1952 at arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1529 kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
CPU: 3 PID: 1952 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc1+ #24 RIP: 0010:kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
handle_preemption_timer+0xe/0x20 [kvm_intel]
vmx_handle_exit+0xc9/0x15f0 [kvm_intel]
? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdf3/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xe55/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x8f/0x750
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
This patch fixes it by disabling preemption while cancelling
preemption timer. This way cancel_hv_timer is atomic with
respect to kvm_arch_vcpu_load.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
thestinger
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Aug 30, 2017
[ Upstream commit 36f41f8 ] pfkey_broadcast() might be called from non process contexts, we can not use GFP_KERNEL in these cases [1]. This patch partially reverts commit ba51b6b ("net: Fix RCU splat in af_key"), only keeping the GFP_ATOMIC forcing under rcu_read_lock() section. [1] : syzkaller reported : in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 2932, name: syzkaller183439 3 locks held by syzkaller183439/2932: #0: (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83b43888>] pfkey_sendmsg+0x4c8/0x9f0 net/key/af_key.c:3649 #1: (&pfk->dump_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83b467f6>] pfkey_do_dump+0x76/0x3f0 net/key/af_key.c:293 #2: (&(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock)->rlock){+...+.}, at: [<ffffffff83957632>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline] #2: (&(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock)->rlock){+...+.}, at: [<ffffffff83957632>] xfrm_policy_walk+0x192/0xa30 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1028 CPU: 0 PID: 2932 Comm: syzkaller183439 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:5994 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:5947 slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:416 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3383 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x24b/0x6e0 mm/slab.c:3559 skb_clone+0x1a0/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1037 pfkey_broadcast_one+0x4b2/0x6f0 net/key/af_key.c:207 pfkey_broadcast+0x4ba/0x770 net/key/af_key.c:281 dump_sp+0x3d6/0x500 net/key/af_key.c:2685 xfrm_policy_walk+0x2f1/0xa30 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1042 pfkey_dump_sp+0x42/0x50 net/key/af_key.c:2695 pfkey_do_dump+0xaa/0x3f0 net/key/af_key.c:299 pfkey_spddump+0x1a0/0x210 net/key/af_key.c:2722 pfkey_process+0x606/0x710 net/key/af_key.c:2814 pfkey_sendmsg+0x4d6/0x9f0 net/key/af_key.c:3650 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x755/0x890 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x445d79 RSP: 002b:00007f32447c1dc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000445d79 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000002023dfc8 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00007f32447c2700 R09: 00007f32447c2700 R10: 00007f32447c2700 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe33edec4f R14: 00007f32447c29c0 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ba51b6b ("net: Fix RCU splat in af_key") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger
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May 21, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
May 22, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Jun 26, 2018
commit 5cc41e0 upstream. WHen registering a new binfmt_misc handler, it is possible to overflow the offset to get a negative value, which might crash the system, or possibly leak kernel data. Here is a crash log when 2500000000 was used as an offset: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff989cfd6edca0 IP: load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] PGD 1ef3e067 P4D 1ef3e067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Modules linked in: binfmt_misc kvm_intel ppdev kvm irqbypass joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid parport_pc qemu_fw_cfg parpy CPU: 0 PID: 2499 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.15.0-22-generic #24-Ubuntu Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] Call Trace: search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0 do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x667/0x810 SyS_execve+0x31/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Use kstrtoint instead of simple_strtoul. It will work as the code already set the delimiter byte to '\0' and we only do it when the field is not empty. Tested with offsets -1, 2500000000, UINT_MAX and INT_MAX. Also tested with examples documented at Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst and other registrations from packages on Ubuntu. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180529135648.14254-1-cascardo@canonical.com Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Jun 26, 2018
commit 5cc41e0 upstream. WHen registering a new binfmt_misc handler, it is possible to overflow the offset to get a negative value, which might crash the system, or possibly leak kernel data. Here is a crash log when 2500000000 was used as an offset: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff989cfd6edca0 IP: load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] PGD 1ef3e067 P4D 1ef3e067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Modules linked in: binfmt_misc kvm_intel ppdev kvm irqbypass joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid parport_pc qemu_fw_cfg parpy CPU: 0 PID: 2499 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.15.0-22-generic #24-Ubuntu Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] Call Trace: search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0 do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x667/0x810 SyS_execve+0x31/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Use kstrtoint instead of simple_strtoul. It will work as the code already set the delimiter byte to '\0' and we only do it when the field is not empty. Tested with offsets -1, 2500000000, UINT_MAX and INT_MAX. Also tested with examples documented at Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst and other registrations from packages on Ubuntu. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180529135648.14254-1-cascardo@canonical.com Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Jun 26, 2018
commit 5cc41e0 upstream. WHen registering a new binfmt_misc handler, it is possible to overflow the offset to get a negative value, which might crash the system, or possibly leak kernel data. Here is a crash log when 2500000000 was used as an offset: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff989cfd6edca0 IP: load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] PGD 1ef3e067 P4D 1ef3e067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Modules linked in: binfmt_misc kvm_intel ppdev kvm irqbypass joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid parport_pc qemu_fw_cfg parpy CPU: 0 PID: 2499 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.15.0-22-generic #24-Ubuntu Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] Call Trace: search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0 do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x667/0x810 SyS_execve+0x31/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Use kstrtoint instead of simple_strtoul. It will work as the code already set the delimiter byte to '\0' and we only do it when the field is not empty. Tested with offsets -1, 2500000000, UINT_MAX and INT_MAX. Also tested with examples documented at Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst and other registrations from packages on Ubuntu. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180529135648.14254-1-cascardo@canonical.com Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Jul 27, 2018
commit 36eb8ff upstream. Crash dump shows following instructions crash> bt PID: 0 TASK: ffffffffbe412480 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "swapper/0" #0 [ffff891ee0003868] machine_kexec at ffffffffbd063ef1 #1 [ffff891ee00038c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12b6f2 #2 [ffff891ee0003998] crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12c84c #3 [ffff891ee00039b8] oops_end at ffffffffbd030f0a #4 [ffff891ee00039e0] no_context at ffffffffbd074643 #5 [ffff891ee0003a40] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd07496e #6 [ffff891ee0003a90] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd074a64 #7 [ffff891ee0003aa0] __do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074b0a #8 [ffff891ee0003b18] do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074fc8 #9 [ffff891ee0003b50] page_fault at ffffffffbda01925 [exception RIP: qlt_schedule_sess_for_deletion+15] RIP: ffffffffc02e526f RSP: ffff891ee0003c08 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffc0307847 RDX: 00000000000020e6 RSI: ffff891edbc377c8 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff891ee0003c18 R8: ffffffffc02f0b20 R9: 0000000000000250 R10: 0000000000000258 R11: 000000000000b780 R12: ffff891ed9b43000 R13: 00000000000000f0 R14: 0000000000000006 R15: ffff891edbc377c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff891ee0003c20] qla2x00_fcport_event_handler at ffffffffc02853d3 [qla2xxx] #11 [ffff891ee0003cf0] __dta_qla24xx_async_gnl_sp_done_333 at ffffffffc0285a1d [qla2xxx] #12 [ffff891ee0003de8] qla24xx_process_response_queue at ffffffffc02a2eb5 [qla2xxx] #13 [ffff891ee0003e88] qla24xx_msix_rsp_q at ffffffffc02a5403 [qla2xxx] #14 [ffff891ee0003ec0] __handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4c59 #15 [ffff891ee0003f10] handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4e02 #16 [ffff891ee0003f40] handle_irq_event at ffffffffbd0f4e90 #17 [ffff891ee0003f68] handle_edge_irq at ffffffffbd0f8984 #18 [ffff891ee0003f88] handle_irq at ffffffffbd0305d5 #19 [ffff891ee0003fb8] do_IRQ at ffffffffbda02a18 --- <IRQ stack> --- #20 [ffffffffbe403d30] ret_from_intr at ffffffffbda0094e [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 000000000000001f RSP: 0000000000000000 RFLAGS: fff3b8c2091ebb3f RAX: ffffbba5a0000200 RBX: 0000be8cdfa8f9fa RCX: 0000000000000018 RDX: 0000000000000101 RSI: 000000000000015d RDI: 0000000000000193 RBP: 0000000000000083 R8: ffffffffbe403e38 R9: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffbe56b820 R12: ffff891ee001cf00 R13: ffffffffbd11c0a4 R14: ffffffffbe403d60 R15: 0000000000000001 ORIG_RAX: ffff891ee0022ac0 CS: 0000 SS: ffffffffffffffb9 bt: WARNING: possibly bogus exception frame #21 [ffffffffbe403dd8] cpuidle_enter_state at ffffffffbd67c6fd #22 [ffffffffbe403e40] cpuidle_enter at ffffffffbd67c907 #23 [ffffffffbe403e50] call_cpuidle at ffffffffbd0d98f3 #24 [ffffffffbe403e60] do_idle at ffffffffbd0d9b42 #25 [ffffffffbe403e98] cpu_startup_entry at ffffffffbd0d9da3 #26 [ffffffffbe403ec0] rest_init at ffffffffbd81d4aa #27 [ffffffffbe403ed0] start_kernel at ffffffffbe67d2ca #28 [ffffffffbe403f28] x86_64_start_reservations at ffffffffbe67c675 #29 [ffffffffbe403f38] x86_64_start_kernel at ffffffffbe67c6eb #30 [ffffffffbe403f50] secondary_startup_64 at ffffffffbd0000d5 Fixes: 040036b ("scsi: qla2xxx: Delay loop id allocation at login") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Jul 27, 2018
[ Upstream commit 0026129 ] rhashtable_free_and_destroy() cancels re-hash deferred work then walks and destroys elements. at this moment, some elements can be still in future_tbl. that elements are not destroyed. test case: nft_rhash_destroy() calls rhashtable_free_and_destroy() to destroy all elements of sets before destroying sets and chains. But rhashtable_free_and_destroy() doesn't destroy elements of future_tbl. so that splat occurred. test script: %cat test.nft table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset %while :; do nft -f test.nft; done Splat looks like: [ 200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363! [ 200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24 [ 200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0 4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff [ 200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90 [ 200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa [ 200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200 [ 200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 200.906354] FS: 00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 200.915533] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 200.930353] Call Trace: [ 200.932351] ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables] [ 200.939525] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 200.947525] ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables] [ 200.952383] ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables] [ 200.959532] ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230 [ 200.963529] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink] [ 200.968384] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink] [ 200.975525] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.980363] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.986356] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 200.990352] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 200.994355] ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130 [ 200.999531] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 V2: - free all tables requested by Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Sep 6, 2018
[ Upstream commit 9970a8e ] GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements. So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains. But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains. In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added. In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied. https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/ test scripts: %cat test.nft table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset [ ... ] table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset Splat looks like: [ 200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363! [ 200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24 [ 200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0 4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff [ 200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90 [ 200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa [ 200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200 [ 200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 200.906354] FS: 00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 200.915533] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 200.930353] Call Trace: [ 200.932351] ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables] [ 200.939525] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 200.947525] ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables] [ 200.952383] ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables] [ 200.959532] ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230 [ 200.963529] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink] [ 200.968384] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink] [ 200.975525] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.980363] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.986356] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 200.990352] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 200.994355] ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130 [ 200.999531] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 Fixes: 9d09829 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
randomhydrosol
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to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened
that referenced
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Nov 9, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size. The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem: #0 [9a0681e8] 704 bytes check_usage at 34b1fc GrapheneOS#1 [9a0684a8] 432 bytes check_usage at 34c710 GrapheneOS#2 [9a068658] 1048 bytes validate_chain at 35044a GrapheneOS#3 [9a068a70] 312 bytes __lock_acquire at 3559fe GrapheneOS#4 [9a068ba8] 440 bytes lock_acquire at 3576ee GrapheneOS#5 [9a068d60] 104 bytes _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0 GrapheneOS#6 [9a068dc8] 1992 bytes enqueue_entity at 2dbf72 GrapheneOS#7 [9a069590] 1496 bytes enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0 GrapheneOS#8 [9a069b68] 64 bytes ttwu_do_activate at 28f438 GrapheneOS#9 [9a069ba8] 552 bytes try_to_wake_up at 298c4c GrapheneOS#10 [9a069dd0] 168 bytes wake_up_worker at 23f97c GrapheneOS#11 [9a069e78] 200 bytes insert_work at 23fc2e GrapheneOS#12 [9a069f40] 648 bytes __queue_work at 2487c0 GrapheneOS#13 [9a06a1c8] 200 bytes __queue_delayed_work at 24db28 GrapheneOS#14 [9a06a290] 248 bytes mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84 GrapheneOS#15 [9a06a388] 24 bytes kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0 GrapheneOS#16 [9a06a3a0] 288 bytes __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c GrapheneOS#17 [9a06a4c0] 192 bytes blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c GrapheneOS#18 [9a06a580] 184 bytes blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192 GrapheneOS#19 [9a06a638] 1024 bytes blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a GrapheneOS#20 [9a06aa38] 704 bytes blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028 GrapheneOS#21 [9a06acf8] 320 bytes schedule at 219e476 GrapheneOS#22 [9a06ae38] 760 bytes schedule_timeout at 21b0aac GrapheneOS#23 [9a06b130] 408 bytes wait_for_common at 21a1706 GrapheneOS#24 [9a06b2c8] 360 bytes xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540 GrapheneOS#25 [9a06b430] 256 bytes __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6 GrapheneOS#26 [9a06b530] 264 bytes xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6 GrapheneOS#27 [9a06b638] 656 bytes xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8 GrapheneOS#28 [9a06b8c8] 304 bytes xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426 GrapheneOS#29 [9a06b9f8] 288 bytes xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e GrapheneOS#30 [9a06bb18] 624 bytes xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6 GrapheneOS#31 [9a06bd88] 2664 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070 GrapheneOS#32 [9a06c7f0] 144 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca GrapheneOS#33 [9a06c880] 1128 bytes xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce GrapheneOS#34 [9a06cce8] 584 bytes xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342 GrapheneOS#35 [9a06cf30] 1336 bytes xfs_bmapi_write at e618de GrapheneOS#36 [9a06d468] 776 bytes xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e GrapheneOS#37 [9a06d770] 720 bytes xfs_map_blocks at f82af8 GrapheneOS#38 [9a06da40] 928 bytes xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6 GrapheneOS#39 [9a06dde0] 320 bytes xfs_do_writepage at f85872 GrapheneOS#40 [9a06df20] 1320 bytes write_cache_pages at 73dfe8 GrapheneOS#41 [9a06e448] 208 bytes xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892 GrapheneOS#42 [9a06e518] 88 bytes do_writepages at 73fe6a GrapheneOS#43 [9a06e570] 872 bytes __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6 GrapheneOS#44 [9a06e8d8] 664 bytes writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2 GrapheneOS#45 [9a06eb70] 296 bytes __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0 GrapheneOS#46 [9a06ec98] 928 bytes wb_writeback at a2500e GrapheneOS#47 [9a06f038] 848 bytes wb_do_writeback at a260ae GrapheneOS#48 [9a06f388] 536 bytes wb_workfn at a28228 GrapheneOS#49 [9a06f5a0] 1088 bytes process_one_work at 24a234 GrapheneOS#50 [9a06f9e0] 1120 bytes worker_thread at 24ba26 GrapheneOS#51 [9a06fe40] 104 bytes kthread at 26545a GrapheneOS#52 [9a06fea8] kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62 To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE (65192) value as unsigned. Reported-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
randomhydrosol
pushed a commit
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that referenced
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Apr 19, 2019
Jakub forgot to either use nlmsg_len() or nlmsg_msg_size(), allowing KMSAN to detect a possible uninit-value in rtnl_stats_get BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rtnl_stats_get+0x6d9/0x11d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4997 CPU: 0 PID: 10428 Comm: syz-executor034 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc2+ GrapheneOS#24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x131/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:619 __msan_warning+0x7a/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310 rtnl_stats_get+0x6d9/0x11d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4997 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x115b/0x1550 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5192 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2485 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5210 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf3e/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1925 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb3/0x1220 net/socket.c:2137 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2175 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2184 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2182 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2182 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Fixes: 51bc860 ("rtnetlink: stats: validate attributes in get as well as dumps") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 30d65e0 ] Fix crash caused by NULL pointer dereference when debugfs functions le_max_key_read, le_max_key_size_write, le_min_key_size_read or le_min_key_size_write and Bluetooth adapter was powered off. Fix is to move max_key_size and min_key_size from smp_dev to hci_dev. At the same time they were renamed to le_max_key_size and le_min_key_size. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002e8 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#24] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 6255 Comm: cat Tainted: G D OE 4.18.9-200.fc28.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO, BIOS 8DET76WW (1.46 ) 06/21/2018 RIP: 0010:le_max_key_size_read+0x45/0xb0 [bluetooth] Code: 00 00 00 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 48 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 8d 7c 24 04 48 8b 80 48 0a 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e8 02 00 00 0f b6 48 52 e8 fb b6 b3 ed be 04 00 00 00 48 RSP: 0018:ffffab23c3ff3df0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0b4ca2e000 RCX: ffffab23c3ff3f08 RDX: ffffffffc0ddb033 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffab23c3ff3df4 RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffab23c3ff3ed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffab23c3ff3f08 R13: 00007f0b4ca2e000 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: ffffab23c3ff3f08 FS: 00007f0b4ca0f540(0000) GS:ffff91bd5e280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000002e8 CR3: 00000000629fa006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Call Trace: full_proxy_read+0x53/0x80 __vfs_read+0x36/0x180 vfs_read+0x8a/0x140 ksys_read+0x4f/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa <matias.karhumaa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Aug 6, 2019
[ Upstream commit e88439d ] [BUG] Lockdep will report the following circular locking dependency: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.0-rc2-custom #24 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/8631 is trying to acquire lock: 000000002536438c (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}, at: btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x475/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_super+0x71/0x80 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2bd/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110 kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0xa0 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x80 deactivate_super+0x51/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x80 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x94/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd8/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x210/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x2da/0x730 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2691/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xa7/0x190 __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshot+0x9d7/0xe60 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x94/0xb0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x415/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x496/0x4e0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xa90/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2 --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &fs_info->tree_log_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by btrfs/8631: #0: 00000000ed8f23f6 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x28/0x60 #1: 000000009fb1597a (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10/1){+.+.}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x70/0x4e0 [btrfs] #2: 0000000088c5ad88 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x128/0x4e0 [btrfs] #3: 000000009606fc3e (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x37a/0x520 [btrfs] #4: 00000000f82bbdf5 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] #5: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] [CAUSE] Due to the delayed subvolume creation, we need to call btrfs_qgroup_inherit() inside commit transaction code, with a lot of other mutex hold. This hell of lock chain can lead to above problem. [FIX] On the other hand, we don't really need to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock if we're in the context of create_pending_snapshot(). As in that context, we're the only one being able to modify qgroup. All other qgroup functions which needs qgroup_ioctl_lock are either holding a transaction handle, or will start a new transaction: Functions will start a new transaction(): * btrfs_quota_enable() * btrfs_quota_disable() Functions hold a transaction handler: * btrfs_add_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_del_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_create_qgroup() * btrfs_remove_qgroup() * btrfs_limit_qgroup() * btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call inside create_subvol() So we have a higher level protection provided by transaction, thus we don't need to always hold qgroup_ioctl_lock in btrfs_qgroup_inherit(). Only the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_subvol() needs to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock, while the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_pending_snapshot() is already protected by transaction. So the fix is to detect the context by checking trans->transaction->state. If we're at TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING, then we're in commit transaction context and no need to get the mutex. Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Aug 6, 2019
[ Upstream commit e88439d ] [BUG] Lockdep will report the following circular locking dependency: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.0-rc2-custom #24 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/8631 is trying to acquire lock: 000000002536438c (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}, at: btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x475/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_super+0x71/0x80 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2bd/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110 kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0xa0 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x80 deactivate_super+0x51/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x80 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x94/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd8/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x210/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x2da/0x730 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2691/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xa7/0x190 __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshot+0x9d7/0xe60 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x94/0xb0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x415/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x496/0x4e0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xa90/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2 --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &fs_info->tree_log_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by btrfs/8631: #0: 00000000ed8f23f6 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x28/0x60 #1: 000000009fb1597a (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10/1){+.+.}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x70/0x4e0 [btrfs] #2: 0000000088c5ad88 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x128/0x4e0 [btrfs] #3: 000000009606fc3e (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x37a/0x520 [btrfs] #4: 00000000f82bbdf5 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] #5: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] [CAUSE] Due to the delayed subvolume creation, we need to call btrfs_qgroup_inherit() inside commit transaction code, with a lot of other mutex hold. This hell of lock chain can lead to above problem. [FIX] On the other hand, we don't really need to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock if we're in the context of create_pending_snapshot(). As in that context, we're the only one being able to modify qgroup. All other qgroup functions which needs qgroup_ioctl_lock are either holding a transaction handle, or will start a new transaction: Functions will start a new transaction(): * btrfs_quota_enable() * btrfs_quota_disable() Functions hold a transaction handler: * btrfs_add_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_del_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_create_qgroup() * btrfs_remove_qgroup() * btrfs_limit_qgroup() * btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call inside create_subvol() So we have a higher level protection provided by transaction, thus we don't need to always hold qgroup_ioctl_lock in btrfs_qgroup_inherit(). Only the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_subvol() needs to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock, while the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_pending_snapshot() is already protected by transaction. So the fix is to detect the context by checking trans->transaction->state. If we're at TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING, then we're in commit transaction context and no need to get the mutex. Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Aug 17, 2019
commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Aug 17, 2019
commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Aug 17, 2019
commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Sep 2, 2019
commit 9c09b21 upstream. syzbot found the following crash on: HEAD commit: e96407b4 usb-fuzzer: main usb gadget fuzzer driver git tree: https://github.com/google/kasan.git usb-fuzzer console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=147ac20c600000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=792eb47789f57810 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881cf591a08 by task syz-executor.1/26260 CPU: 1 PID: 26260 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc2+ #24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 lock_acquire+0x127/0x320 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4412 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 hiddev_release+0x82/0x520 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:221 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x8ef/0x2c50 kernel/exit.c:878 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:982 get_signal+0x466/0x23d0 kernel/signal.c:2728 do_signal+0x88/0x14e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:815 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:159 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x459829 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f75b2a6ccf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000075c078 RCX: 0000000000459829 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 000000000075c078 RBP: 000000000075c070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000075c07c R13: 00007ffcdfe1023f R14: 00007f75b2a6d9c0 R15: 000000000075c07c Allocated by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:487 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:460 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:748 [inline] hiddev_connect+0x242/0x5b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:900 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:449 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1423 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1470 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3012 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3953 hiddev_connect.cold+0x45/0x5c drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:914 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881cf591900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff8881cf591900, ffff8881cf591b00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00073d6400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da002500 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0200000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff8881da002500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881cf591900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff8881cf591a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881cf591a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== In order to avoid opening a disconnected device, we need to check exist again after acquiring the existance lock, and bail out if necessary. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Sep 2, 2019
commit 9c09b21 upstream. syzbot found the following crash on: HEAD commit: e96407b4 usb-fuzzer: main usb gadget fuzzer driver git tree: https://github.com/google/kasan.git usb-fuzzer console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=147ac20c600000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=792eb47789f57810 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881cf591a08 by task syz-executor.1/26260 CPU: 1 PID: 26260 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc2+ #24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 lock_acquire+0x127/0x320 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4412 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 hiddev_release+0x82/0x520 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:221 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x8ef/0x2c50 kernel/exit.c:878 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:982 get_signal+0x466/0x23d0 kernel/signal.c:2728 do_signal+0x88/0x14e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:815 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:159 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x459829 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f75b2a6ccf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000075c078 RCX: 0000000000459829 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 000000000075c078 RBP: 000000000075c070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000075c07c R13: 00007ffcdfe1023f R14: 00007f75b2a6d9c0 R15: 000000000075c07c Allocated by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:487 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:460 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:748 [inline] hiddev_connect+0x242/0x5b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:900 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:449 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1423 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1470 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3012 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3953 hiddev_connect.cold+0x45/0x5c drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:914 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881cf591900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff8881cf591900, ffff8881cf591b00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00073d6400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da002500 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0200000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff8881da002500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881cf591900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff8881cf591a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881cf591a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== In order to avoid opening a disconnected device, we need to check exist again after acquiring the existance lock, and bail out if necessary. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx
referenced
this pull request
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Sep 2, 2019
commit 9c09b21 upstream. syzbot found the following crash on: HEAD commit: e96407b4 usb-fuzzer: main usb gadget fuzzer driver git tree: https://github.com/google/kasan.git usb-fuzzer console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=147ac20c600000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=792eb47789f57810 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881cf591a08 by task syz-executor.1/26260 CPU: 1 PID: 26260 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc2+ #24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 lock_acquire+0x127/0x320 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4412 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 hiddev_release+0x82/0x520 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:221 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x8ef/0x2c50 kernel/exit.c:878 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:982 get_signal+0x466/0x23d0 kernel/signal.c:2728 do_signal+0x88/0x14e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:815 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:159 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x459829 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f75b2a6ccf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000075c078 RCX: 0000000000459829 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 000000000075c078 RBP: 000000000075c070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000075c07c R13: 00007ffcdfe1023f R14: 00007f75b2a6d9c0 R15: 000000000075c07c Allocated by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:487 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:460 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:748 [inline] hiddev_connect+0x242/0x5b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:900 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:449 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1423 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1470 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3012 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3953 hiddev_connect.cold+0x45/0x5c drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:914 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881cf591900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff8881cf591900, ffff8881cf591b00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00073d6400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da002500 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0200000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff8881da002500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881cf591900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff8881cf591a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881cf591a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== In order to avoid opening a disconnected device, we need to check exist again after acquiring the existance lock, and bail out if necessary. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch was modified from Grsecurity's Trusted Path Execution feature
Implements the concept described here: http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article
Signed-off-by: Matt Brown matt@nmatt.com